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Of All Professions, Prostitution Is The Oldest
(Except Possibly for Teaching)
Joseph Ellin
Michael Davis would have us believe that there is a
Socratically correct defmition of 'profession.' Dialogue will get
us there; he tells us where dialogue (much of it internal, perhaps)
has gotten him. I am not convinced.
There are amateur athletes and amateur musicians, but no
such thing as an amateur prostitute. If you take money for sex
you are a prostitute; if not, you aren't. Hence 'professional
prostitute' is redundant, as 'professional musician' is not. But
there are semi-pro athletes and (no doubt) semi-pro musicians; a
person who gives an occasional concert for pay is not a
professional musician. Professionals earn their living at doing
what they profess, as Davis says, but this condition is not
sufficient to make one a professional: someone drafted into the
army earns his living (during the term of his service) by being a
soldier but is not a professional soldier. There is (humorously)
such a thing as a professional student, but this term does not
describe a student who attends university on a full-ride
scholarship. In this sense, 'professional' describes someone who
makes a career of some occupation, and who thus identifies
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himself with that occupation (independently, perhaps, of whether
he's actually earning a living doing it: a professional student is
someone who never leaves school, not someone who earns
money by studying).
There appears to be a somewhat suppressed difference
between being a professional and having a profession.
Professional athletes are professionals; in fact, this sense of
profession, earning money by doing something at a high level of
skill, may well be the only sense of professional in common
usage. But is being an athlete a profession? My sense of English
is that we don't quite want to allow that. Yet why should we say
that being a prostitute is having a profession, while hesitating to
say the same about being an athlete? But perhaps I am mistaken
about what others would say: perhaps they would say that playing
sports for a living is indeed having a profession. Other than
counting noses, there seems no way to adjudicate this
disagreement, if it exists; and indeed as Davis points out, there is
very little agreement about what occupations are and what are not
properly called 'professions.' This suggests that any attempt to
formulate a common deftnition is unlikely to succeed other than
by stipulation.
Davis says there are many 'senses' of the word
professional, and indeed there are. This fact alone would not
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make the prospect of fmding one central defmition, very
encouraging. Socratic defmition is possible only where usage is
standardized sufficiently to allow the possibility of a common
sense (deviant cases and usages aside). Socrates thought this held
for such terms as 'justice' and 'virtue,' and 'wisdom,' but only in
an extreme form of Platonic realism can we suppose that it must
hold for all or most interesting terms in the language. Davis
dismisses what he calls the 'sociological' approach, in which one
collects actual uses and more or less makes lists of how the term
is used, but appears to give no argument why this approach is less
satisfactory than the Socratic search for a common defmition.
Even Socrates (on one view anyway) did not simply assume there
were necessary and sufficient conditions for every term he
examined; rather, his method is purely hypothetical: on the
hypothesis that there are (or may be) necessary and sufficient
conditions, we look to see if we can discover them. Of course
where Socrates and sociologists differ is that Socrates subjects
proposed defmitions to rigorous examination; his goal is not a
consensus defmition but a consensus that has withstood severe
logical tests. Comparison of linguistic intuitions about word
meanings-sociology-is useful, perhaps necessary, but is hardly
exhaustive of the Socratic method. Nonetheless such comparison
is revealing, and what it reveals here is that, as Davis somewhat
too cheerfully admits, we seem to have no common list of
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professions, at least judging by what he has found among the
sociologists: "Law and medicine are always on the list; the
clergy, often; and other occupations commonly acknowledged as
professions, such as engineering, sometimes" (2). This bodes ill
for the prospects of fmding a common defmition: suppose
Socrates and his interlocutors disagreed among themselves as to
whether courage or cowardice, temperance or dissipation, were
virtues or vices (they all agree that justice is a virtue, but disagree
as to what justice is). Socrates would have to appeal (as he does)
to extra-defmitional consensus principles ('Surely we all agree
that being virtuous makes the virtuous person happy') and
empirical fact ('Is the dissipated person happy? Who can think
so?'). Unless comparable principles are available, the hypothesis
that by Socratic means a common meaning will be reached is
likely to fail, it seems to me.
And it does. Let us turn to Davis' defmition. Professions,
he says, echoing the self-promotion of apologists, serve "a moral
ideal in a morally permissible way ... ," where each of these
conditions is necessary for some occupation to qualify as a
profession. Now the ftrst thing one thinks of here is that the term
'profession' is an honoriftc; we don't want to call anything a
'profession' unless we approve of it. So the ftrst thesis in the
defmition is close to tautological. Close, but not quite, as Davis
wants professions not only to be morally acceptable, but to serve
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'a moral ideal.' And there is reason to think that he wants them to
serve an actual moral ideal, not just a supposed or imagined
moral ideal (he takes pains to explain this, pg 8). 'Moral ideal'
carries weight for him, but it's not clear what weight or how
much, as it seems to take very little for an occupation to qualify:
"a state of affairs everyone ... at her rational best recognizes as a
significant good" (8). Science, he says, serves the moral ideal of
providing us knowledge (assuming that we all at our rational best
want to obtain knowledge); but if that's all that's needed, then so
does farming, so does clothesmaking, so does the construction
trade, and many other occupations: for at our rational best, we all
want to eat, to wear clothes, to obtain shelter. Or so one would
imagine. There is a second disconnect between something being a
profession, and something serving a moral ideal. I think just
about anyone would regard the clergy as a profession, though
perhaps for reasons Davis doesn't give. Where does that leave
those people who think that religion is a pernicious influence, and
the clergy a force for evil, on the whole? There are many such
people; their writings (once) used to be easy to fmd. On Davis'
account, they cannot hold that the ministry is a profession, which
may surprise them. Why should their linguistic practice be bound
by this particular stipulation? And the same observation could be
made with regard to other dissidents. Libertarians for example
might acknowledge that city planning, or public administration
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generally, is a profession, but hold (as they do) that all such
efforts do more harm than good and ought to be abolished.
Then there are those who do not take professional
propaganda at face value. The moral ideal served by the legal
profession, Davis and the ABA tell us, is "to help people obtain
justice within the law (8)." We can accept that this objective is
indeed a moral ideal while yet holding that the objective of the .
legal profession is much other than this and is closer to what 0 W
Holmes once said it is, namely, to counsel clients how to achieve
their ends without running afoul of the law. Davis might counter
that the ideal as he states it ought to be the objective of lawyers,
even if it isn't; but this concession to reality would possibly
require him to revise his defInition of profession into something
more hypothetical. Iwill offer this: a profession is an occupation
where a moral ideal is available, whether or not the practitioners
actually acknowledge or practice it.
Yet this condition is likely to run aground due to the very
uncertainly about lists Davis cites. Surely, we want to say,
teaching meets that criterion and is thus far a profession? Artists,
in all their variety, serve, or could well serve, the ideal of
enhancing human experience, and so qualify? And don't athletes,
actors, magician, jugglers and hosts of other entertainers in fact
serve the (very important?) moral ideal of providing amusement,
relaxation, and distraction from the worries of the day? Any
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rational person would approve of this, would they not? But if we
are unwilling to call these pursuits professions, or even if, as
Davis presumably would agree, we are not clear whether these
occupations are professions or not, then we are going either to
have to say more about what a 'moral' ideal is, or reject the moral
ideal condition.
Davis' second criterion is that a profession must serve its
moral ideal "in a morally permissible way beyond what law (etc)
require" (7), which he later elucidates as requiring a "special"
moral standard (beyond the law etc). The professional soldier, he
says, (apparently overlooking the distinction between being
professional and having a profession) is distinguished from the
"mere mercenary" by serving his country honorably. He does not
explain this further but no doubt it is true that, theoretically at any
rate, the mercenary is motivated by money and is thus available
to the highest bidder, whereas the professional soldier's
motivation is different, involving love of country perhaps, or a
desire to protect his fellow-citizens. Putting aside the objections
of pacifists, anarchists, anti-imperialists, anti-militarists, and
perhaps others who think that no motivation is enough to excuse
the professional soldier's willingness to earn his livelihood by
killing (and therefore soldering cannot serve a 'moral ideal'), we
can ask why, other than by stipulation, this difference qualifies
soldering as a profession but disqualifies the mercenary. I have
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no idea what soldiers (in Davis' sense) think about mercenaries,
but though. they may disdain them for the reason given, I doubt
they regard them as not being members of the very same
profession, the profession of soldering. So what is the Socratic
line of inquiry which can show them that in this they are
mistaken?
Conclusion. As noted, the term 'profession' is an
honorific; occupations apply it to themselves in order to enhance
their status and thus, income and authority. As an evaluative, it is
unlikely that the term carries necessary and sufficient conditions;
application of evaluatives is in general in part a matter of choice.
Arguments that a certain occupation should indeed be granted the
status of profession are carried on in part by analogy with
acknowledged professions, in part as matters of social fairness
('we nurses are just as important as doctors '), in part by appeals
to social good ('teachers are in the business of preparing the
future'), and, indeed, by whatever means may come to hand. If
these arguments resonate, language will reflect ensuing changes
of attitude. Since criteria of application are at best rough., the
'sociological' approach to definition seems correct. As the
sociologists say, there are several characteristics that are
generally associated with professions. Occupations possessing
enough. of these characteristics come to be regarded as
professions. There is no definitive list of what these
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characteristics are, and hence no fmal word as to whether a given
occupation is or is not a profession. The 'useful defmition'
approach of "the best selling textbook in engineering ethics" (4)
seems thereby validated.
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